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Betwixt   and   Between:  
 Bangladesh   Military   in   Business.   A   Comment   from   an   International   Perspective  
Soldiers in Business – Global and Historical Phenomena:
First of all, one has to emphasize that this discussion is about a phenomenon which is not 
a sole Pakistan or Bangladesh trend, or an Asian invention, but rather appears worldwide. 
Second, business activities of soldiers are not a new trend. They can be traced back some 
hundred years ago –  even before the emergence of standing armies –  where a military 
leader had to be not only a soldier but also an entrepreneur who had to accumulate funds 
and other resources by himself to keep his troops fighting. In other words, taking military 
history into account, the notion that an army should be maintained exclusively by a state or 
its government is quite young. In more recent times, certain events and developments like 
the two World Wars, processes of de-colonization, or the implosion of the Soviet Union led 
to a further opening up of opportunities for the military to enter the economic sphere as well 
as to a sophistication of their already existing business activities. Today, military economic 
enterprises come in various shapes and forms like Military-Owned-Businesses (whole or 
partly, often via foundations and cooperatives), Military-Private Partnerships and Military 
Collaborations with Private Businesses, including Private Sponsorship Programs for the 
armed forces. Beside these types of military business which are normally operating 
formally in a legal framework, in addition the list of profit-orientated activities, involvements 
of the armed forces in criminal activity to extract “unconventional resources”  must be 
added in certain cases. Such types of military business activities can involve all services 
and tiers of the armed forces and can be carried out by the military as an institution, one or 
various services/units or an individual soldier from the top brass to the rang-and-files. Many 
countries in Africa, Latin and Central America, and Asia particularly the so-called “post-
communist states”  have already a detailed history of military business activities covering 
virtually all segments of their economies, e.g. running media, entertainment and leisure 
enterprises as well as agricultural farms, providing basic transportation and logistics 
services (by sea, land and air), offering services in numerous economic sectors from health 
to finance (e.g. finance, real estate, banking, insurance), wide-scale manufacturing of 
pharmaceutical products, vehicles, machines, textiles, and consumer goods etc.
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Soldiers in Business – Reinvention of the Military?:
With the large-scale extension of the military business phenomenon, the discourse of its 
extinction gained momentum. Generally one can state that the idea to stop or at least to 
monitor the enterprises of the armed forces is deeply linked with processes of stabilization 
and consolidation of democracies and the demand for the entrenchment of control over the 
armed forces as a necessary condition. Today under the virtual cue “well resourced and 
poorly guided,” the military as owners, stakeholders, or managers of economic enterprises 
becomes increasingly targeted. Many cases are by political analysts identified in which the 
military attempts to counter the loss of political prerogatives or the tightening of their 
defense budgets by getting involved in economic affairs. Therefore, in the context of 
increasing international aversions against armed forces interventions into politics the 
military is portrayed as an institution which tries to reinvent itself by substituting its lose in 
political power by economic strength.
Political Implications – Losing the Power of the Purse:
This reinvention, it is stated, would provide the soldiers with a new kind of cunning and 
subtle mechanism to gain autonomy which has fare reaching impacts on the balance of 
power between civilians and military. Through the switch from exercising political to 
economic control, the military can avoid strategies of overt and formal influence on the 
political decision-making process to ensure their corporate interests. Entrepreneurial 
activities, pursuant to the claim of the antagonists, constitutes a kind of self-financing which 
is by nature off-the-budget which makes the armed forces independent from government 
allocations. To display this as a challenge towards the development of (liberal) democracy, 
further arguments are put forward. 
First, business activities facilitate the military top brass to reduce the oversight 
opportunities of the parliamentarians over the defense budget. Here, since the armed 
forces can always turn to other, non-state-resources the civilians are losing the budgeting 
process as a key instrument to keep the army in check. However, in this context it is also 
emphasized that the establishment of civilian control is even more undermined when a lack 
of civilian concern and expertise comes across.
Second, civilian oversight is also challenged because military business is typically not 
recognized in the decision-making process for the defense budget - at least in traceable 
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patterns. Additionally, they are (mostly) not visible either to the politically leadership nor to 
the general public, as such it undermines the principles of transparency and accountability. 
Third, it also might enforce the phenomena of so-called “secret-budgets” used for hidden 
and extra-legal activities remaining out of bounds for any governmental control authority, 
usually with reference to matters of national security. This can be considered as an 
outstanding disturbance of civil-military relations because it tends to increase the power of 
the armed forces at the expense of civilians as well as the military’s reluctance towards 
supremacy of elected representatives.
Fourth, in the context of extra-legal activities, military business is also accused to entangle 
the soldiers in criminal activities, corruption, or human rights abuses etc. Especially in 
areas of conflicts it is alleged that military is interested to maintain a fragile internal security 
situation to expand or maintain lucrative profit-orientated enterprises. Therefore, military 
business brings (in particular cases) soldiers in direct conflict with other state agencies. It is 
also not uncommon that such struggles turns into an unrestrained competition with other 
security forces (Police, Paramilitary) over the domination of economic resources.
Last but not least, these negative effects are aggravating when business activities motivate 
the military to influence the political decision-making process for the sake of protecting their 
economic interests with the aim to bounce back civilian control efforts. This can only be 
avoided by effective parliamentary oversight over the defense budget as well as clear 
regulations (including total restriction) on business activities.
Economic Aspects – Pros and Cons:
Protagonists emphasize two major functions of military business. First, it promotes 
development and nation building. Here the entrepreneurial activities of the soldiers can 
make remarkable contributions to industrialization and modernization of countries. This is 
an argument which one can find especially in socialist and/or post-communist states. 
Following the Keynesian path it is argued that the military business is promoting economic 
development which inspires not only the defense industry but also creates spill-over affects 
on other economic sectors. Therefore it will support not only social change but also 
national cohesion. 
Second, military business reduces financial constraints on governments. This line of 
reasoning follows basically two paths: 
In one way, military business activities are portrayed as a reduction of the burdens for the 
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state and society since the soldiers are “more self-financed”. This would reduce the 
pressure on the national budget. Consequently the governments would have more 
flexibility to invest in other, non-defense related spheres. This line of arguments is 
particularly used in countries which are in processes of economic and socio-political 
transformations.
In another way, since these business activities are for the financing of welfare and other 
social services for the military – from soldiers for soldiers –the work load, responsibilities 
and liabilities of civilians will be reduced. 
To summarize the main rationale of the protagonists, military business is legitimate and in 
many cases needed. This is because it supports the development of state and nation as 
well as it takes care of soldier’s basic requirements, especially in cases of budget 
shortcomings and economic constraints to be able to satisfy the needs of the armed forces. 
This would significantly help to ensure national security even during outstanding crisis 
situations.
In response to those pros, some cons were interposed on the debate. A major argument 
made, is that military business will lead to a distortion of processes and rules of free 
markets since the soldiers, due to their closeness to state authorities, are often provided 
with political and economic privileges which gives some advantages over “private sector 
competitors”. Additionally, free economic competition will be hampered by a threat 
perception among the other non-security actors that the military will play an unfair role by 
introducing coercive power as an instrument in conventional business practice. Especially 
those entrepreneurs arising from the middle class, who are in many countries identified as 
a spearhead of economic development, have to suffer under such market distortions 
because they remain outside the murky economic-political frameworks produced by 
military business. 
Special problems arise if the military becomes financially dependent on business activities. 
First, military funding is conditioned by fluctuations in the (global) economic market (e.g. 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, World Financial and Economic Crisis in 2007-2010) and can 
succumb to its trends, norms and procedures. This makes the funding of the military 
budget and the entire military institution vulnerable which could create an additional threat 
in the national security situation, perhaps even challenging national sovereignty. 
Second, maintaining the level of income from “legal”  business (in cases of economic 
deprivation or mismanagement etc.) might force the military entrepreneurs to become 
involved in criminal economic activities like drug and human trafficking, smuggling or 
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ambiguous services like offering security services to private individuals, companies or 
institutions outside the realm of national defense.
Additionally it is alleged that the military personal, being primarily soldiers and not 
entrepreneurs, are running enterprises apriori inefficient and ineffective which introduces 
market distortion and irrationalities into the economic sphere. 
Related to that it is also argued that there might be a threat that “management decisions” 
are not at any time on the lines of economic evaluations but more influenced by political 
and security related considerations. Here, a fundamental challenge appears if the military 
is structuring the economy in security-dominated patterns (e.g. war economy, arms race). 
This could lead to shortages in the provision of essential, consumer goods, services and 
resources for civilians. According to the last points made, the claimed positive impact of 
military business on the economic development is either very limited or non-existent. 
Military Aspects – Professional Soldiers in Pinstriped Suits?:
Regarding the military internal dimension the advocates of business activities emphasizes 
mainly that they serve the active and retired personnel of the armed forces regarding their 
well-being and re-integration into society. This will enforce not only internal cohesion of the 
military as well as entrenchment of morality, discipline and loyalty among the soldiers but 
also lead to acceptance of civilian leadership, therefore providing the necessary socio-
economic and political framework. Here the rationale is that the profitable engagement in 
entrepreneurial affairs is also a disincentive to resist orders which has a twofold affect on 
the behavior of the soldiers: First, the threat to lose economic opportunities and benefits 
makes the officers and rank-and-file subservient to the military hierarchy. Second, the 
military as an institution will become loyal to the civilian government which has – at least in 
normative terms – the power to separate the armed forces from the business sphere. Both, 
it is argued, will reduce the likelihood of military interventions into politics.
However, this is countered by the statement that business activities do not serve the 
improvement of conditions for active troops or well-being of disabled and retired soldiers 
but the profit orientation of certain individuals. The argument that military business led to 
integrated armed forces is heavily challenged. It rather generates factions and cliques 
based on new or resurrected cleavages between those who strive to share distribution of 
wealth, benefits and privileges. In brief, the antagonistic Mantra is: “doing business 
disintegrates the military”, which avoids the cultivation of professionalism including the 
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growth of corruption, a decline of military discipline, norms and values, and a breakdown in 
the chain-of-command. This happen on various levels: 
First, it increases diversions between the different services and units. Here the access to 
economic opportunities is largely dependent upon the nature of a certain service, or the 
geographically deployment of a unit (e.g. economic hub or remote area) which is dividing 
the armed forces in rich and poor segments. 
Second, frictions will appear between the individual soldiers especially between the high-
ranking and low-ranking officers as well as between officers and the rank-and-file. In both 
dimensions an unequal access to socio-economic benefits and resources lead to 
disturbances of military cohesion. According to some assertions, these will even become 
more serious when economic-orientated “young turks” among the officers are emerging. 
Being interested in ensuring personal shares in contemporary and future businesses, they 
get in direct conflict with up-coming reform measures which are not in favor of military 
business. /Third, it is necessary to state that not all military personnel, especially among 
the top brass, share the same preferences for or take a common stand regarding economic 
interests. This leads to confrontations between professionally oriented officers and those 
who want to be “soldiers in pinstriped suits”. Besides the tensions between “Have(s) and 
Have Not(s)”, it is argued that these intra-military-conflicts in particular and economic 
involvement in general have a diametrical impact on military professionalism and combat 
readiness. Due to the entanglement in business activities the military is losing its focus on 
the original task of defending the country, preparing a war and managing security. Here the 
critics points out that an unavoidable conflict exists between the military’s primary security 
function as a neutral agent of the state and its interests as a profit-orientated economic 
actor. Tensions emerge especially when the military becomes involved in internal security 
tasks which might have effects on its business activities as in areas were remarkable 
natural resources are available. On more practical lines, it is stated that too many military 
personnel are taking time off from their regular duties to carry out entrepreneurial activities 
to satisfy their own or military institutional profit-orientated interests. This will lead to further 
erosion of combat preparedness.
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Military, Business and Society – Triangle of Disturbance:
The protagonist argues that when restrictions or even a ban on military business activities 
are imposed, the society (and its government) has to deal with the additional financial 
burden and administrative tasks of taken care of social welfare of their active and retired 
military personal. Additional, the military business can function as a catalyst to complement 
civilian efforts or even fill the gaps where the state is not able to perform its duties (e.g. in 
isolated or remote areas) to promote socio-economic development. Therefore, 
entrepreneurial activities will a relief for the society.
However, critics are stating that military business has a strong negative impact on the 
reputation and perception of the armed forces in society. It is asserted that the military 
image becomes seriously damaged when corruption, human rights violations and other 
socio-economic abuses (e.g. extortion, confiscation of goods, land and properties) are 
identified as an outgrowth of military business activities. This tends to alienate the general 
public from their fellow countrymen in uniform, a process which is further deepened when 
economic interests transform the armed forces into an “isolated and self-replicating 
community” or as generally referred to as a “state within a state”. On the other hand, when 
the armed forces are held in low public esteem, this reduces the morale and discipline of 
the soldiers. This process will gain momentum especially in countries which are born out of 
armed conflicts (e.g. decolonization, succession). 
Here the imminent threat exists when the general image of the military turns from being a 
symbol of purity, unity and integrity of the nation into something which can be described as 
an enemy of the public which is merely interested in money-making at the expense of the 
society. This societal perception can extend a rift not only between soldiers and the state 
but also enforce mutual distrust. Consequently, an atmosphere will be created in which the 
military is reluctant to feel responsible and accountable towards society and its institutions. 
Furthermore this might prepare the ground for fortifying soldiers to engage in political 
interventions.
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Military Business in Bangladesh:
The roots of business activities of the Bangladesh Armed Forces can be identified in 
various phases of which three are of special importance. 
First, there is an “historical-behavioral-heritage”. Here, the War of Liberation characterized 
by the nature of a guerilla struggle produced a rudimentary type of “self-financing”. Despite 
the fact that this help-your-self-attitude remained rudimentary since the war covered only a 
period of ninth months plus foreign supplies were available, it became extra-ordinary 
entrenched in the first years after independence. Due to this wasteful economic 
deterioration of the war-torn country and a budgetary policy which was not in favor of 
building up regular armed forces, there was a “cross-factional” consensus among the 
military echelon that one could not rely on the government at that time to satisfy its basic 
needs. This rationale was especially emphasized by the so-called returnees from West 
Pakistan who were deeply influenced by the conviction of military morale and 
organizational superiority and the perception of civilian weaknesses in running the state of 
affairs.
Second, this attitude became aggravated by an ideological stream of leftist thinking, which 
advocated the notion of transforming the conventional armed forces into a kind of 
“production oriented army” on the model of the Chinese People’s Army. In other words, the 
armed forces had to be an inseparable part of the country’s production system. Although 
these leftist elements were literally eliminate in the Bangladesh military one should not 
underestimate the resilience of this ideological dimension.
Third, there is an “inherited-organizational-aspect”  regarding military business. Influenced 
by the internalized structural design of the Pakistan Army it was decided to establish the 
Sena Kalyan Sangstha (SKS) as a successor of the Pakistan Fauji Foundation. Having this 
in mind, military business in Bangladesh started as in many other countries (e.g. Turkey, 
Pakistan, Indonesia), through military-owned foundations with the intention to provide 
social services, such as pensions, societal reintegration of retired personal, education, 
housing and medical treatments, for the troops and their families. Contemporary critics 
claim that this expanded widely, ostensibly not only to pay for their welfare measures but 
also to generate funds which were used for activities beyond the original charitable 
purpose. However, the welfare-oriented business model led to the establishment of more 
enterprises and today military business is represented in almost all key sectors of 
Bangladesh’s economy.
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Here lies the crux of the current debate. Based on the observation that military business is 
expanding it appears obvious to some political observers that there are similarities 
regarding the economic activities of the armed forces in Pakistan and Turkey, especially in 
terms of  claimed negative concomitants, like corruption, unfair use of advantages, 
breakdown off military norms and structures. Here some notes should be added.
1) The fact that the military foundations like the Sena Kalyan Sangstha are involved in 
various types of manufacturing and services must be first and foremost interpreted as a 
rational managerial decision to diversify its own business portfolio. As such it is a common 
entrepreneurial strategy to reduce economic risks which one can find among welfare-
orientated as well as purely profit-orientated entities worldwide. Consequently this means 
not necessarily the creation of an “economic leviathan” aiming to dominate all other 
spheres of national life or gain financial autonomy to be able to undermine civilian control 
efforts. Regarding the principle of transparency it seems that Bangladesh’s armed forces 
makes no secret out of the legal, institutionalized business activities. 
2) As far as these business activities are concerned there is mostly a clear separation 
between ownership and management, e.g. in the case of the Dhaka Radisson Hotel. In 
other words, the Bangladesh military tries to avoid a direct involvement of active soldiers in 
business activities. As such the threat that the military institution by running economic 
enterprises is a priori distracted from its original mission to defend the country will be hard 
to identify at the moment. However, various retired top-ranking officers expressed their 
unease about business activities. But this cannot be interpreted as an indication of a 
decline in the cohesion of the military or other internal disturbances.
3) One has be also aware that the Bangladesh military is, like in most countries (due to its 
nature) an economic (f)actor, by virtue of its size as well as the relatively large portion of 
national resources consumed by the defense forces. Therefore, attempts to eliminate 
military business out of the civil-military equation seem to be impossible.
4) However, despite the fact that Bangladesh’s armed forces are increasing their 
entrepreneurial activities in quantitative as well as qualitative terms, their commercial 
conglomerate still seems far away from becoming the military business empires of 
Pakistan, Turkey or China and Indonesia before their latest reform attempts. Therefore, 
each comparison with one of these countries is lacking in substance, regarding the current 
state of affairs. Furthermore, it is misleading and narrows down the debate on certain 
aspects of and/or becomes a “blistering critique” on the Bangladesh military. In this context, 
one can state that there is no “Military-Business-Complex”, “Military-Industrial-Complex” or 
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“MILBUS”  (Military & Business, see Ayesha Siddiqa’s works) which is threatening the 
socio-economy and the democratic development of Bangladesh. In other words, from an 
international point of view, the “official”  business activities of the military are still on a 
moderate level, at least for the time being.
Conclusion – Betwixt and Between:
Today in many countries, the processes of “de-militarization”  of the economies are 
discussed and various measures to separate soldiers from business activities are appear 
to be proceeding. Unfortunately, such efforts have remained insubstantial due to the 
subject’s political delicacy and restrictions. Regarding Bangladesh, until more substantial 
research is carried out, only tentative and general observations are possible. Nevertheless, 
from an international comparative perspective some contributions to enrich the discussion 
can be made.    
First of all, a discourse on military business must include a neutral evaluation of the 
legitimate right and need for the armed forces to generate commercial interests and 
consequently to enter the economic sphere. In this context one has also to address the 
question “what are the real welfare needs of troops?” Since this is a main justification for 
the existence of military enterprises, some clarification is needed to consolidate the 
discussion. Here one has to point out that only a naive observer would describe the 
realization of entrepreneurial interests by any armed force as a purely philanthropic 
exercise. Nevertheless, even if military business in Bangladesh remains legal and 
accommodates good business practice, they are still “off-budget”  and have to be 
transparently reported and publicly accountable. To avoid any confusions and obstacles 
towards democracy and good governance, military self-financing has to be made 
compatible with the concept of civilian control. Therefore, overall assessments of the 
already-existing control strategies and instruments as well as the introduction of a clear 
legal framework to monitor the additional channels for the military to generate funds are 
needed. To avoid a judicial vacuum and loopholes, which might lead to serious tensions 
within civil-military relations, the specification of law enforcement mechanisms must be 
sine qua non. To implement these conditions, a defense policy and higher defense 
organization have to be formulated and/or finally decided; a functioning (complete) 
parliament must be on the spot, an effective parliamentary committee system with sufficient 
authority and resources has to be set up (especially without interference from the executive 
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branch of government).
In this direction, stronger participation of the civil society must be expected. Here one might 
refer to the famous speech by then United States President Dwight Eisenhower in 1961 
who stated “that only an engaged citizenry offered the only effective defense against the 
misplaced power…”. Here an active society can serve as a valuable source of strength for 
the (civilian) elected representatives to entrench control over all kind of military activities 
including business. Here, in the aftermath of the landslide victory of the Awami League as 
well as taking into account the consequences of the last caretaker government (2007/08) 
and the Bangladesh Border Rifles uprising (2009), there is a opportunity and an urgent 
need to reform or streamline the rules and procedures of military business activities.
After all, one has to raise the question what is the actual aim of Kamal Azad’s documentary 
and the subsequent discussion - the ban on all business activities of the military or an 
initiation of a certain political-economic reform program? Here some more detailed 
elaboration of the producer of “Fauji Baniija”  with detailed suggestions will have an 
enlightening impact. However, each participant in this debate should know that questioning 
military business in Bangladesh is like “opening the Box of Pandora”. It definitely, 
conscious or unconscious, is touching Bangladesh’s most significant social and political 
flashpoints, e.g. lack of democratic political culture, poor performance of political 
institutions, tense civil-military relations, and weak civilian control. Therefore, the debate on 
military business is extraordinarily important and should be encouraged, but also provided 
with some structure.
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